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Abstract
Promoting renewable energy sources (RES) has been addressed a key
strategy for mitigating climate change, the governing in which has turned
out a challenging and protracted task for the EU. There is often an implicit
assumption that concern for climate change drives energy policy, but a
closer look at the development of European RES policy indicates how EU
governors have had to confront a range of governance dilemmas in trying to
balance various objectives and conflicting interests. Therefore, while energy
security and environmental concerns have provided a rationale for crafting
renewable energy as a specific EU policy domain, the main driver for RES
policy coordination has been internal market concerns, and not the concern
about an impending climate catastrophe. More recently, rising concerns
about energy insecurity and climate change have forced the EU to seek
greater policy coordination in the context of more integrated energy
markets. Although seemingly propitious for further harmonisation, it is
doubtful whether the Member States and their citizens are yet prepared to
accept new efforts towards deeper integration of European energy policy.
Keywords EU; European governance; renewable energy sources; climate
change; energy policy
Promoting renewable energy sources(RES) has been addressed as akey strategy for mitigating climate
change, but governing renewable energy
from Brussels is, to say the least, a
challenge.1 Energy policy has traditionally
been a matter of national control while
mainly the responsibility for market
liberalisation has resided at the EU
level. Across Europe, EU Member States
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have employed different strategies
and mechanisms to promote renewable
energy technologies at varying stages of
development. To make such a patchwork
of national policies to work coherently
and effectively is a daunting task. Indeed,
the development of EU renewable energy
policy has been a protracted one in which
EU governors have had to confront a set
of critical governance dilemmas in trying
to balance between various objectives
and conflicting interests.
The aim of this article is to capture the
nature of promoting renewable energy as
a governance dilemma for EU governors.
Governing any policy problem requires
political choices to be made between
alternative courses of action. Choices
have to be made about, for instance, the
definition of the problem, aims and objec-
tives, the appropriate political level to act
on and which types of policy instrument
to deploy. Drawing on Jordan et al (2010),
who describe how such choices generate
‘governance dilemmas’, we investigate
four types of dilemmas that have been
critical for governing renewable energy in
the EU. The first dilemma arises from the
choice of what problem policy makers
seek to address among all those that con-
cern the public. Renewable energy has
been articulated as the solution to the
dependence on imported energy, to cli-
mate change and to market inefficiencies,
but in the EU the relative salience of these
problems have varied over time. The
second dilemma relates to the choice of
levels to act on, and we hereby describe
a move from ‘policy coordination’ to
‘regulatory harmonisation’. The third
dilemma is about which modes and
instruments of steering that are selected
to address the problem at hand. In the
widest sense, the choice here has
been between efforts to push renewable
energy technologies onto the market
(through R&D support) or to pull them
into the market (through deployment
support) and, further, between specific
instruments. The fourth dilemma is about
how to secure policy change and ensure
compliance. The key choice here is
about whether to enforce (sanctions) or
to encourage implementation (informal
instruments). In this respect, previous
implementation deficits have paved the
way for new enforcement measures in the
current RES Directive.
The article is organised as follows. First
we outline the historic development of
European renewable energy policy in
terms of five distinct phases. We then
describe each governance dilemma in
more detail and use them to illuminate
the choices that have been made when
striving to govern renewable energy in
the EU. In the concluding reflections we
look across the dilemmas to establish
what have most affected the rationales
behind crafting renewable energy as a
specific EU policy domain.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF
EUROPEAN RENEWABLE
ENERGY POLICY
European renewable energy policy has
been long in the making. It developed
slowly from quite loose forms of co-
operation in the 1980s towards a com-
mon policy framework in the recent
climate and energy package. Over time,
the modes and means of EU coordination
have evolved in a stepwise fashion that
can be described in a series of different
phases (see Table 1). The first phase
coincides with the search for ‘new energy
‘ywe investigate
four types of
dilemmas that have
been critical for
governing renewable
energy in the EU’.
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sources’ in the aftermath to the oil crises
in the 1970s. The EC tried to exploit these
supply-sided shocks to develop a com-
mon energy strategy, but did not succeed
in attracting Member State support
beyond very loose forms of intergovern-
mental co-operation, around a set of
indicative energy security objectives.
The second phase represents the estab-
lishment of renewable energy on the EC
agenda in the late 1980s. In the 1986
revision of the community energy objec-
tives (COM(85) 245) renewable energy
was addressed as a policy priority for
the first time. The Joule and Thermie
programmes provided financial support
to ‘non-nuclear energies’, but implied only
a continuation of the previous soft coor-
dination of research, development and
demonstration (R&D) policies.
In the third phase the first steps
towards a common RES policy framework
were taken. National energy policy shifted
in the early 1990s from supporting
R&D to promoting market deployment of
renewable energy, particularly in ‘pio-
neering states’ such as Germany and
Denmark. The first steps towards creating
an internal energy market, and concern
for the environment, called for EU-level
action. The first specific EU-wide RES
initiative, ALTENER (COM(92) 180), was
introduced in 1993 with the aim to double
the RES share by 2005. However, since
ALTENER lacked the character of a coher-
ent strategy, merely providing support to
demonstration projects, the European
Parliament in 1995 called for an action
plan to advance the EU’s involvement
(Lauber, 2005), and similar proposals
were made in the Energy Policy White
Paper (COM(95) 682). From this point in
time, renewable energy came to be seen
as a solution to a triad of issues: environ-
mental and climate change, security of
supply and economic competitiveness.
The Commission outlined a common
policy strategy in the 1997 White Paper
Energy for the Future: Renewable sources
of energy (COM(97) 599) that set out an
indicative objective of doubling the RES
share to 12 per cent by 2010. Although
the measures addressed to achieve this
goal lacked legal underpinning, and thus
remained an act of policy coordination,
with hindsight this marked the birth of EU
RES policy.
In the fourth phase, the policy strategy
began its translation into a regulatory
framework. After years of controversy,
first the 2001 RES-E Directive (2001/77/
EC) and then the 2003 Biofuels Directive
(2003/30/EC) set out targets for renew-
able electricity generation (21 per cent)
and biofuels (5.75 per cent) by 2010.
The RES-E Directive established guiding
principles on administrative procedures,
‘guarantees of origins’ (GO) and grid
access, but settled for indicative targets
instead of binding ones due to Member
State opposition. During the prepara-
tions, the Commission also made efforts
to harmonise national support policies,
but this turned out to be deeply contested
issue (Rowlands, 2005). While the Com-
mission’s preference for an EU-wide
tradeable green certificate scheme was
supported by some Member States (e.g.,
the UK), it was strongly opposed by
others (e.g., Germany, Spain). A decisive
moment was the ECJ final judgement on
the Preussen Elektra versus Schleswag
case passed in early 2001. The ECJ
concluded that feed-in tariffs did not
violate EU State Aid rules, which forced
the Commission to tone down its support
for tradeable certificates for the time
being (Rowlands, 2005; Lauber, 2005;
Johnston et al, 2008).
The fifth phase is about the establish-
ment of the current regulatory frame-
work that aims at increasing the total
RES share to 20 per cent and to raise
the proportion of transport biofuels to
10 per cent by 2020. In January 2007,
the Commission proposed these new RES
targets and addressed regulatory initia-
tives in the Renewable Energy Roadmap
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(COM(2006) 848). At first, when the
European Council approved the 20 per
cent target (March 2007), the principle of
differentiated mandatory targets was lar-
gely undisputed. But a year later, the
inclusion of binding national targets in
the draft RES Directive (COM(2008) 19)
proved highly contentious. Apparently,
basic disagreements over the harmonisa-
tion of national policies were still not
resolved (Toke, 2008). Some states,
notably the UK, again pressed for flexible
implementation mechanisms such as
trade in GOs, but were once more
opposed by others. In the final Directive
(2009/28/EC), a compromise was rea-
ched, providing for flexible co-operation
mechanisms in terms of interstate ‘sta-
tistical transfers’, that is, permitting those
states exceeding their indicative targets
to transfer their surplus to others, as well
as joint projects and support schemes.
As the attempts to introduce a GO trading
regime were unsuccessful, ‘guarantees
of origins’ are thus only eligible for
disclosure in target accounting, not for
cross-border trade (Nilsson et al, 2009).
Controversy also surrounded the sus-
tainability criteria for biofuels. Despite
fierce opposition from NGOs and in
the European Parliament, the biofuels
target subsisted. But in response to
the addressed problems associated with
first-generation biofuels (i.e., bioethanol,
biodiesel), priority was given to second-
generation biofuels, electric and hydro-
gen vehicles. At time of writing, Member
States are about to submit their national
renewable energy action plans as
required in the new directive. In the
forecast documents recently submitted
(European Commission, 2010), Member
States project to slightly overachieve the
20 per cent target by 2020, with some
states anticipating a surplus and others a
deficit. This indicates at least some room
for the new co-operation mechanisms.
Therefore, although the Commission
did not succeed to harmonise national
policies any further, the RES Directive will
permit bottom-up coordination.
CONFRONTING
GOVERNANCE DILEMMAS
A ‘dilemma’ is usually defined as a
situation in which one must choose
between equally unpleasant alternatives.
Jordan et al (2010) use the concept to
draw attention to the political choices that
are inherent in the art of governing a
particular issue or domain. These are, for
example, choices about the definition and
framing of problems, the appropriate
levels and scales of governance, the
selection and calibration of different pol-
icy instruments, the distribution of costs
and benefits among the governed and the
mechanisms for ensuring implementation
and compliance. As these choices involve
values that are seldom commensurate
and are subjected to time constraints,
they normally entail governance dilem-
mas to which there are no easy solutions.
The fact that various actors being gov-
erned typically subscribe to different
framings of ‘the problem’, and vary in
their perceptions of equity, effectiveness,
transparency and democracy, makes the
governance of something as renewable
energy immensely difficult. If governing
involves making difficult choices within a
set of institutionalised structures, we
need to know what kinds of choices these
might be. Here, we investigate four parti-
cular types of dilemma that are prone to
be critical for governing renewable
energy in the EU.
‘yRES Directive permits
bottom-up coordination
but it does not
harmonise national
policies any further’.
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WHY GOVERN RENEWABLE
ENERGY: AUTONOMY, CLIMATE
CHANGE OR MARKET EFFICIENCY?
Governing is a purposive activity, but
precisely which problems does it seek
to address? ‘Problems’ are never simply
‘out there’ but are presented as a result of
social processes in which actors engage in
struggles to frame particular phenomena
into problems that suit their political
interests or policy competences. Policy
makers often find themselves drawn to
particular problem framings because they
appear to fit with the way in which they
are confronting other problems. This in
turn raises yet more issues. For example,
who is deemed responsible for the
emergence of particular problems? Have
governors deliberately promoted it or
was it an unforeseen outcome of their
otherwise legitimate activity? Once the
choice about the nature of the problem,
and hence the purpose of governance,
have been identified, other choices
quickly loom into view.
Governing renewable energy in the
EU relates to how problem framings
have changed over time and the impact
this has had on the formulation of policy
objectives. In the early years of the EU,
the development of nuclear power cap-
abilities secured a great deal of political
attention. However, the energy crises in
the 1970s triggered a search for alter-
native sources of energy including renew-
ables. At this point, securing affordable
energy supplies was the overriding pro-
blem frame, while environmentalists
sought to draw attention to the potential
future role of RES. This conflation of
energy security and rising environmental
concerns was briefly conducive to the
early development of RES, but mostly
they were viewed as an adjunct to
nuclear power, domestic coal and
natural gas. In the 1990s, some states
began introducing carbon taxation to
promote energy performance and RES
deployment, but falling energy prices
did weaken the case for RES investments
in most EU states. In recent years,
energy security has returned as a major
policy objective in the context of rising
world market prices for energy, gas
crises in Europe and predicted ‘supply-side
crunches’ (IEA, 2007). Thus, renewable
energy is enjoying a renaissance with
rising awareness of its potential economic
and social benefits.
While energy security and environmen-
tal concerns have motivated national
efforts to accelerate renewable energy,
advancing a policy framework at EU level
has to be seen against the backdrop of
the EU’s longer-term ambition to promote
liberalised and integrated energy mar-
kets. New problems were thus viewed
through the prism of existing compe-
tences, namely, the EU’s commitment to
the four freedoms. Although energy was
not originally subject to the Internal
Market White Paper (COM(85) 310), the
Commission turned its attention to the
liberalisation of energy markets as early
as 1988 (COM(88) 238). In the following
years, the Commission and its Energy
Commissioner played a key role as policy
entrepreneurs (Nylander, 2001) in devel-
oping a far-reaching proposal for an
internal market in gas and electricity
(COM(91) 548). In so doing, the Commis-
sion managed to reconcile the principles
of supply security and market liberalisa-
tion (McGowan, 2008: 94) by reframing
electricity as an ‘open market commod-
ity’, the trade in which could be facili-
tated through neoliberal deregulation
(Nylander, 2001: 297). This formed an
additional rationale for stronger EU policy
intervention in national energy affairs,
and helped to unite various parts of the
Commission. For instance, while tradi-
tional views on electricity supply as a
public service issue resided in DG Energy,
deregulationist ideas were cultivated in
DG Competition (Nylander, 2001). More
importantly, the proposal implied a need
roger hildingsson et al european political science: 11 2012 23
for a level playing field upon which
various energy sources could compete
with each other.
Since the mid-1990s the Commission
has claimed that this triad of energy
policy objectives could be addressed
simultaneously through the diversification
of energy supply, deployment of renew-
able energy and liberalisation of energy
markets (see e.g., COM(2007) 1). In the
new draft Energy Strategy for Europe
beyond 2010, currently under consulta-
tion, this line of reconcilement is sup-
ported, while concerns about low-carbon
technology innovation, as addressed in
the Strategic Energy Technology plan
(COM(2009) 519), are gaining ground.
NATIONAL OR EUROPEAN
INTERESTS: POLICY
COORDINATION OR REGULATORY
HARMONISATION?
After having worked out what problem(s)
to address, governors have to decide at
which level to act. Here, themain choice in
the EU is between acting nationally or
locally (e.g., guided by the principle of
subsidiarity) or at higher levels, for exam-
ple, regionally or at the global level. There
are several level and scale dilemmas
buried away in this choice: greater local
diversity may offer more opportunities for
experimentation and bottom-up learning,
but fewer opportunities for learning across
space. National decisionmakersmay have
more direct access to information, but run
the risk of ‘capture’ by national interests.
In practice, the choice between different
political levels is seldom neither a binary
one, as action may be required at several
levels simultaneously, nor an entirely
open choice as governors typically have
stronger legal competence, or prior pre-
ference, to act at some levels than others.
In the EU, energy policy has tradition-
ally been an issue of national compe-
tence. The Lisbon Treaty changes this,
and the contents of both the 2008
climate-energy package and the new EU
energy strategy indicate how the con-
tours of a common energy policy are
slowly emerging. Greater integration
has, however, only been reached through
a very slow and stepwise coordination of
national energy policies. The seeds of an
RES policy at the EU level are to be found
in the 1997 White Paper and the RES-E
and Biofuels Directives. Prior to 1997,
energy insecurity concerns were simply
not acute enough to trigger the develop-
ment of a more coordinated approach.
The emergence, first, of environmental
and, then, more specific climate change
concerns spurred support for greater EU
involvement, but only generated weakly
coordinated policies. It was not until
the Commission creatively exploited the
internal market objectives that suffi-
ciently strong political support for deeper
integration and harmonisation emerged,
in order to ensure compatibility with
liberalised energy markets.
In one sense, then, an underlying
choice has gradually been made to devel-
op RES policy at the EU level. Common
policy objectives have been adopted of a
progressively more binding nature. How-
ever, the debates surrounding the choice
of policy mechanisms and the 2009
RES Directive demonstrate the continuing
salience of dilemmas related to the level
and scale of governance. Therefore, while
harmonisation of support mechanisms
is regarded a long-term objective, the
Commission have found it too early,
given factual variations in resource avail-
ability and institutional capacity among
‘In many ways, the new
RES Directive can be
understood as a half-way
house between policy
coordination and deep
harmonisation’.
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states (SEC(2008) 57). In many ways,
the new RES Directive can be understood
as a half-way house between policy coor-
dination and deep harmonisation. For
instance, the efforts to advance a stan-
dardised GO regime very much implied a
first step towards an EU-wide tradeable
certificate scheme (Nilsson et al, 2009).
Between the two approaches to trade –
one intergovernmental (state level), the
other cross-border (firm level) – prepared
by the Commission, only the interstate
approach was retained in the final Direc-
tive, due to opposition from countries
with feed-in systems. Hence, while the
provisions for ‘statistical transfers’ and
for joint support schemes allow for bot-
tom-up coordination of national policies,
it does not amount to deep harmonisa-
tion. Despite this fact the EU policy has,
nonetheless, contributed to a de facto
convergence in national support mechan-
isms. The 2008 progress review (SEC
(2008) 57) provided no reason to depart
from the status quo, and in crafting the
new RES Directive, the Commission did
not push hard for further harmonisation,
so as not to forestall Member State
opposition in order to reach agreement
in time before the 2009 European Parlia-
ment elections (Toke, 2008). But the
perceived need to choose whether and
how far to harmonise support mechan-
isms remains, a choice closely related
to modes and instruments dilemmas, to
which we now turn.
POLICY INSTRUMENTS: A
CONTESTED GROUND
Governing always entails choices about
how to act. A critical choice is between
regulating a set of enforceable social
norms hierarchically, incentivising certain
behaviours through market-based instru-
ments, or relying on more network-based
modes to build trust and share capacity
among private and public actors. Choos-
ing which mode and instrument of gov-
ernance to enact is closely related to
concerns about policy effectiveness,
cost-efficiency and legitimacy. As many
policy interventions do invariably gener-
ate losers as well as winners, policy
makers have a choice to make (deliber-
ately or not) about which costs and
benefits to take into account, how to
allocate them and whether (and how) to
compensate any losers. In governing
renewable energy one can distinguish
between two main policy strategies: early
EU policies concentrated on ‘soft’ coordi-
nation via harmonised technological
R&D policies to push new renewable
energy technologies onto the market.
Although this fostered early technological
learning, it failed to increase deployment
significantly. In the 1990s, national
policy makers therefore tried to stimu-
late demand and pull renewables into
the market by market-supporting mecha-
nisms such as feed-in tariffs; quota
obligations based on tradeable green
certificates; tendering systems; and
incentive-based systems (taxation,
subsidies). Out of these, feed-in tariff
systems and tradeable green certifi-
cate schemes have been most widely
imposed.2
The foremost lesson regarding the pro-
motion of renewable energy is that RES
deployment is a long-term and evolution-
ary process that requires enduring policy
support. Government policies such as
R&D, demonstration and investment sup-
port seem to have been the single most
important factor behind, for example, the
strong deployment of wind power in
Germany (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).
Similarly, studies of wind power in
Denmark (e.g., Meyer, 2006; Agnolucci,
2007) and biomass energy in Finland and
Sweden (e.g., Ericsson et al, 2004;
Jacobsson, 2008) emphasise the impor-
tance of policy support and political sta-
bility. Taking technological maturity and
different stages of development into
account is further viewed as crucial. In
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general, investment grants seem suitable
for immature technologies, whereas feed-
in tariffs seem most effective during the
interim stage of market introduction. By
contrast, premium feed-in tariffs or quota
obligations based on tradeable certifi-
cates could be appropriate ‘once the
markets and technologies are sufficiently
mature and market size is large enough to
guarantee competition’ (Resch et al,
2007: 42). Therefore, while loose forms
of policy coordination were probably more
appropriate during the early phases of
technological and institutional learning,
an EU-wide policy framework came to
be viewed as necessary to ensure that
RES made up a significant part of the
energy mix.3
The EU has tried to render national
policies more effective and economically
efficient. The dominant support mechan-
isms delegate responsibilities from the
state to the private sector and shift
the burden from state budgets (i.e., tax
payers) to energy consumers. This dis-
tributional feature has been largely over-
looked in the debate about alternative
policy instruments. While tradeable certi-
ficates are often presented as though
they are the most market-oriented mea-
sure, this neglects that competition also
takes place in price-based feed-in sys-
tems. In fact, both systems are market-
based; the difference lies in the means
used to determine prices and quantities
(Hvelplund, 2005). Both systems can, if
designed properly, effectively promote
renewables (Hvelplund, 2005; van der
Linden et al, 2005), but a range of
empirical studies indicate that feed-in
tariffs have induced the most rapid and
cost-effective deployment (e.g., Held
et al, 2006; Resch et al, 2007; SEC
(2008) 57). Because of its long-term
minimum prices, feed-in tariff systems
provide more stability and greater inves-
tor security than tradeable certificates
schemes (Mitchell et al, 2006). As this is
a more critical problem for independent
small investors, the RES industry has
tended to prefer feed-in tariffs, in opposi-
tion to incumbent power utilities.
These issues about instrument choice
have, since the late 1990s, generated a
fierce debate in Brussels and a formid-
able struggle between two main camps
of interests, cutting across the European
energy industry and the Member States.
The independent RES industry points
out the advantages of more diversified
energy supplies, such as economic inno-
vation, job creation and energy security.
By contrast, major electricity suppliers
subscribe to the view that the high
cost of investing in new RES requires
mechanisms stimulating market-based
competition. While the power industry
emphasises cost-effectiveness as a main
concern, the RES industry addresses
existing market distortions and calls
for greater competition and fair access
to energy markets. Unsurprisingly, the
RES industry advocates feed-in tariff
schemes, while the power industry
tradeable green certificates (Toke,
2008). The Commission has, with sup-
port from ‘deregulationist’ states (e.g.,
the UK), endorsed certificate schemes as
being better at promoting competition
between energy sources, and hence
more compatible with liberalised energy
markets. Irony of ironies, the burgeoning
RES industry has concurrently grown
stronger and, together with feed-in
states such as Germany and Spain,
successfully resisted every attempt to
impose such a pan-European policy
regime. This has forced the Commission
to defuse its ambitions to harmonise
policy mechanisms, mustering instead
on other issues.
SECURING COMPLIANCE:
ENCOURAGING OR ENFORCING?
Crafting policies is one thing, but making
states comply is another. Once enacted,
policies have to be implemented and
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enforced. The main governance dilemma
here revolves around achieving coordina-
tion through relatively non-hierarchical
norms or through hierarchical means.
Examples of the former are reporting
requirements, shaming and blaming.
Examples of the latter are fines and legal
sanctions. These issues are not only of a
technical nature but are highly political
issues. In practice, a balance has to be
struck between the two, so that systems
with clear penalties also develop less
coercive elements, and vice versa. Look-
ing at the previous RES-E and Biofuels
Directives, the EU did try to design them
to ensure compliance. The RES-E Direc-
tive obliged Member States to evaluate
how well their regulatory frameworks
facilitate compliance, required them to
streamline administrative procedures
and ensure access to the grid for renew-
able electricity generators. The national
targets for 2010 were only indicative, but
the Commission has nevertheless been
able to use them as justification for legal
action against laggard states. If Member
States failed to comply with their target
without ‘justified reasons’, the Directive
entitled the Commission to present
‘appropriate proposals’ (e.g., mandatory
targets). The Commission hesitated to do
this before the draft RES Directive was
issued in 2008, although Member States
have varied greatly in their implementa-
tion and that reforming administrative
rules for licensing, planning and grid
access have proved to be especially
troublesome (IEA, 2008).
The 2009 RES Directive thus enhances
the implementation measures, although
still lacking stringent enforcement mecha-
nisms such as financial penalties. Most
importantly, it contains legally binding
targets for the Member States. It sets out
an indicative trajectory towards 2020 for
each country and provides for regular
reviews to encourage compliance. In
2010, Member States issued national
action plans outlining ‘adequatemeasures’
to meet their targets, with biannual pro-
gress reviews. The legally binding nature
of the targets implies, in principle, that
infringement proceedings may be initiated
against laggard states. But more likely is,
given the informal norm of negotiated
enforcement in the EU, that they will be
obliged to submit amended plans to reme-
dy any shortfalls.
CONCLUSIONS
The story of renewable energy policy
at the EU level is a story about a slow,
and at times cumbersome, crafting of
a policy domain. Along the protracted
way towards a common RES policy
framework, the EU has had to grapple
with a range of governance dilemmas.
The EU’s capacity to govern has devel-
oped slowly because energy supply
remains a key area of national interest.
In the 1970s and 1980s, renewable
energy was not deemed important
enough to justify deeper EU-level coor-
dination, and hence integration was held
back by Member States’ unwillingness to
enable Brussels to govern in this field.
It was not until the liberalisation of
European electricity markets in the latter
half of the 1990s, that a clear EU-level
rationale for harmonising national RES
policies emerged as an extension to the
integration of electricity distribution.
Hence, policies for the promotion of
renewable energy have developed gra-
dually from loose forms of interstate co-
operation, to deeper forms of policy
coordination and regulatory harmonisa-
tion. The process started slowly via
support to R&D and demonstration,
important for technological learning and
for securing early acceptance and legiti-
macy of subsequent policy interventions.
The more explicit EU RES policy dates
from the mid-1990s, when ALTENER was
introduced as the first specific EU-wide
initiative, followed by the first compre-
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hensive RES policy strategy in 1997, and
later on by a series of regulatory initia-
tives leading up to the recent climate and
energy package.
The Commission’s ability to develop
a harmonised framework has been ham-
pered by conflicts between the EU insti-
tutions, Member States and industrial
and environmental stakeholders. In
essence, the overriding governance
challenge has been to balance various
interests and strike the right chord
among three different policy objectives
(competitiveness, energy security and
climate change mitigation) and compet-
ing values (market efficiency versus
deployment effectiveness). Concerns
about energy insecurity and climate
change have given the promotion of
renewable energy a strong push at the
national level, but have not carried
the same weight at the EU level. The
internal energy market has provided the
primary justification for deeper coordi-
nation and is the dominant ‘problem’ that
EU RES policy seeks to address. There-
fore, while renewable energy and climate
change policies developed contempora-
neously in the EU, a key driver of the
former has been the concern for the
internal market, and not the concern
about an impending climate catastrophe.
This explains why the Commission has
continued to advocate harmonisation in
the general sense, without coming down
firmly in favour of one particular model
or mechanism. The debates triggered
by the 2009 RES Directive brought
these ongoing issues back into sharp
focus. However, compared with earlier,
the additional presence of energy inse-
curity and climate change concerns
made it considerably easier for the Com-
mission to make the case for more
ambitious and, perhaps even more cru-
cially, binding targets.
Taken together, these concerns provide
a propitious case for continued integra-
tion that, eventually, may pave the
way for harmonisation not only of
energy market regulations, but also
national mechanisms supporting renew-
able energy. However, that remains to be
seen; after all the resistance to a harmo-
nised policy regime seems stronger than
ever. Continued ambitions to deploy RES
at a vast scale will require further policy
and institutional reforms at both national
and EU level, and the Commission cur-
rently tries to exploit the provisions made
in the Lisbon Treaty to advance a common
energy policy strategy. But it is doubtful
whether the Member States and their
citizens are yet prepared to accept further
efforts in that direction towards deeper
integration of energy policy. Thus, the
RES policy looks set to continue provok-
ing challenging governance dilemmas for
the EU.
‘ywhile renewable
energy and climate
change policies
developed
contemporaneously in
the EU, a key driver of
the former has been the
concern for the internal
market, not concern
about an impending
climate catastrophe’.
‘yit is doubtful whether
the Member States
and EU citizens are yet
prepared to accept
further efforts in
that direction towards
deeper integration
of energy policy’.
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Notes
1 The article is based on research conducted within the ADAM project (www.adamproject.eu)
as presented in Jordan et al (2010).
2 In eighteen Member States the main support mechanism is feed-in tariffs or feed-in premiums (price-
based). In seven Member States, tradeable green certificates/quota systems (quantity-based) have been
introduced (SEC(2008) 57; IEA, 2008).
3 The EU deployment of RES is rapidly growing, although when viewed against the agreed targets
(12 per cent by 2010; 20 per cent by 2020) performance is insufficient. In 2008, the EU RES share was
10.3 per cent of final energy consumption compared to 8.5 per cent in 2005 and 6.3 per cent in 1991
(COM(2008) 30; SEC(2011) 130). Renewable power increased to 16.6 per cent of gross electricity
consumption and biofuels to 3.5 per cent of transport fuel consumption in 2008 (SEC(2011) 130), still
short of the indicative 2010 targets (21 per cent; 5.75 per cent). The Commission estimates that Member
States will reach only 19 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively, by 2010 but considers the new RES
Directive to be satisfactory to support ongoing growth in wind and solar energy, although additional
efforts are required to accelerate biomass energy (COM(2009) 192).
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